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l. INTRODUCTION 
The current attempt of transforming socialiat economies 
based in atate ownerahip and central planning into capitalist 
economies with private property and free markets ia one of the 
most exciting issues of the world economy in the early 1990s. 
Radical programa of economic reform in Eastern Europe after 
1989 have relied heavily on a new orthodoxy that, on one hand, 
places strong emphasis on shock therapy-type macroeconomic 
stabilization and, on the other hand, stresses the role of free 
markets, thus urging rapid trade and financial liberalization, 
one-off privatisations and indiscriminate opening to foreign 
investment. 
These programs may perfectly be examined in a development 
economics analytical framework. The new paradigm represents a 
sharp departure from the widespread consensus that emerged from 
the lessons derived from the recessive stabilization policies 
folllowed in the 1980s in some Thir ... World countries, such as in 
Lat"l'n America, and also from the previous development strategies, 
based on state dirigism, pursued in some successful developing 
economies, such as those of the Asian Newly Industrializing 
Countries (NICs), and from their cautious and gradual 
liberalization policies in the 1980s. 
The starting point of this paper arises from a striking 
alternative which has be en recently stated as follows: 
"the Asian example poses a dilemma for bodies such as the 
IMF and the World Bank, specially in former communist 
countries. Does it still make sense to advocate a form of 
shock therapy the doctrine that deregulating and 
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privatising everything as fast as possible is the optimurn 
policy? Or should they recornrnend East Asia's slower, more 
interventionist path to economic maturity?" (Prowse, 1993: 
15) • 
This paper arques in favour of an affirmative answer to the 
latter question. It suggests that the experience of the East 
Asian NICs (South Korea and Taiwan) challenges the theoretical 
basis which underpins the current free market reforms, and may 
even offer a model (or, at the very least, sorne lessons) for a 
successful transition in Eastern Europe. It shares the assurnption 
of rnany cornrnentetors thet post-socielist trensition ·will not be 
eesy, will largely have to be rnedieted by the stete end [that) 
r.v;'-OECD forms of econornic orgerriozation should be explored" 
(Taylor, 1992: 1) and that ·useful lessons of how to do things 
right rnight come frorn Asia" (Fry end Nuti, 1992: 32). 
Furthermore, the Asian rnodel is begining to be teken into eccount 
by politicians end economists in the transitional economies 
themsel ves: "many policy-rnakers ( ..• ) in the formerly planned 
eC9nomies of Eastern Europe ( .•• ) openly sey that the coexistan ce 
of "'plens end rnerkets in East Asian capi talism can be a useful 
rnodel in their transition efforts" (Lee and Lee, 1992: 108). 
Firstly, foreign trade policies and the role of states and 
markets are reviewed in the East Asian contexto The basic 
conclusion is that the growth performance of South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s did not teke place in a laissez-
faire regirne but wi th trade restrictions end pervesive government 
interventions, through rnenaged credi t and export policies, public 
investrnent, 
of foreign 
features of 
stete enterprises, financial control end rnonitoring 
direct investrnent (FDI). Furthermore, the main 
their economic liberelizetion in the 1980s ere also 
highlighted, as it did not proceed in e big bang rnanner but 
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through selective import liberalization and the gradual lifting 
of regulations over the financial system and FDI. 
Secondly, the main effects of shock therapy in post-
socialist Eastern Europe are briefly considered, since the 
stabilization efforts may be ill-conceived and a gradualist 
approach to macroeconomic imbalance correction could be much more 
fruitful. It is also suggested that rapid trade liberalization 
and the accelerated tendency towards minimal public sectors may 
prove to be a wrong path, as they will probably lead to acute 
economic and social disruptions. 
The conclusions surnmarize the arguments and suggest that 
Eastern Europe pOlicy-makers and econ;.; .• tists, and al so western 
advisors, should turn their attention much more to the Asian 
NICs' experiences, as they may prove very useful in order to 
achieve an economically successful and socially balanced 
transition. 
2. IMPORT PROTECTION AND STATE INTERVENTION IN SOUTH ROREA 
AND TAIWAN: A SHORT SUMM.J),R~ 
As already noted, South Rorea and Taiwan did not follow a 
liberal development strategy in the 1960s and 1970s, contrary to 
the claims of neoclassical economists such as Balassa (1988) or 
Krueger (1990). In the 1960s, they pursued a state-led 
industrialization in which private firms relied heavily on the 
active credit, exchange rate, export and technology policies 
designed and implemented by the government. Their adjustments to 
the 1970s' external shocks, al though this issue will not be 
discussed here, did not involve strictly orthodox fiscal and 
monetary policies but were based instead on increased public 
investment in education and infrastructure (and even on heavy and 
chemical industries in the case of Rorea) and low interest rates. 
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Furthernore, their liberalizetion policies in the 1980s 
followed a cautious path. After the second oil shock, monetary 
policy became tighter but, throughout the decade, imports were 
liberalized in a selective way and control s over the financial 
system were only lifted gradually. 
(a) Trade regimes and state policies 
Before reviewing the growth contribution of import 
protection, several preliminary aspects should be kept in mind. 
Firstly, the magni tu de of the import liberalization process 
undertaken in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s has been 
largely ~;:=tggerated by neoclassical e c.' ,lomists: extensi ve 
researchs have clearly shown that the tariff system remained 
virtually intact and that non-tariff barriers were only lightly 
reforned (Luedde-Neurath, 1986 and Wade, 1990, chapo 5). 
Secondly, the resulting average effective protection rate was 
certainly lower than in Latin America but not low by 
international standards and it presented a high sectoral 
I dis',~ersion, wi th very high rates in consumer durables, 
internediate goods, machinery, and transport equipment (Weiss, 
1988: 274). Thirdly, protection continued beyond the import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) phase and pervaded most of 
the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) period, because its 
negative impact was offset by massive export incentives: the 
result was a strategy of "export oriented import substitution", 
an audacious but incisive tern coined by Gold (1986). 
The Asian NICs provided extensive protection to domestic 
industries in several interesting ways that substantially 
departed from the experience of other Third World countries, most 
notably in Latin America. 
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Firstly, they used protection on infant industry grounds, 
as did many other developing countries. What seems to be unique 
to the Asian NICe is that this kind of protection al so served to 
"incubate" export sectors. During the ISI phase, South Korea and 
Taiwan applied an export-import link system, under which only 
firms achieving export targets could obtain import licenses. 
Moreover, in Korea several devaluations (in 1954, 1955 and 1960) 
preceded the large currency depreciatione undertaken in 1961 and 
1964 with the launching of the EOI strategy. Furthermore, even 
during the ISI period, exporters were granted with incentives, 
such as favourable exchange rates, rebates of tariffs, 
preferential access to long- and short-term credit and reductions 
in all or almost al1 direct and indirect taxes (Alam, 1989: 55-6 
for Taiwan and Westphal, 1990i 47 for Korea).' 
Thus the government urged infant industries to pursue an 
early outward orientation. This use of protection as an 
"incubator" of export sectors contrasts sharply with the 
experience of Latin America in the 1950s, where protection acted 
as a powerful greenhouse under which inefficient and 
internationally non-competitive industries prosper~ti; 
In the EOI period, protection was also used to enhance the 
competitiveness of production in world markets, through a 
strategy that Krugman (1984) termed "import protection as export 
promotion". Import controle (often in the form of quotae that set 
ceilings on imports) allowed firms to impose high prices and to 
obtain high rates of return on their sales in the domestic 
market, which presented a low elasticity of demand with respect 
to price. This high profitability, in turn, made possible to 
squeeze export prices: by sheltering the non-export sales, the 
government enabled firms to practice discriminatory pricing on 
their exports and sales in the domestic market (Westphal, 1990: 
47). An excellent study on South Korea's development has also 
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shown that ·if overseas sales were not always profitable ( ••• ), 
then the goverrunent compensated the losers by inflating the 
returns on domestic sales. It did so by imposing trade barriers 
on imports· (Amsden, 1989: 69-70). A good (but by no means the 
only) example is the Rorean automobile industry which received 
simul taneously protection and nornal export incentives. This kind 
of protection could be considered as a hidden subsidy to exports 
(Smith, 1991: 11). 
Finally, protection furthernore acted as an instrument of 
industrialization, that is, as a dynamic lever to diversify the 
industrial sector. South Rorea often imposed import controls 
through a de facto "law of similars", under which an import 
license was only gr~ñted if the firn wishing to import 
product could demonstrate that the item was not 
domestically at reasonable terns (Westphal, 1990: 
F. specific 
available 
47). The 
goverrunent also imposed local-content rules in order to require 
specific industries to procure a growing share of their input s 
from domestic producers (pack and Westphal, 1986: 95). Moreover, 
exp~rt incentives were increasingly extended to indirect 
exp~~ters, that is, manufacturers of internediate and capital 
':goods used in the production of consumer durables for the world 
markets. In the 1970s, the Rorean goverrunent introduced 
additional import restrictions on internediate and capital goods 
in order to deepen this substitution process. 
In short, the Asian NICs used protection as an 
industrialization "tool", so as to foster the internal backward 
linkages of the consumer durables' dynamic export sector. Most 
other developing countries, such as those in Latin America, 
considered export industries merely as a foreign exchange source I 
primarily in order to finance the imports required by the 
prolongation and deepening of ISI and also to service the foreign 
debt. 
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Turning now to the role of the state, it should be 
remembered that what Albert Hirschman termed late-late 
industrialization processes (Hirschman, 1968: 8-9), like those 
of South Korea and Taiwan, have proceeded without technological 
innovations (that is, they have been characterized by the absence 
of pioneering technologies). Instead they have been based on 
learning, so development has tended to be guided, much more than 
in Gerschenkronian cases of late-industrialization (Germany, 
Italy, Russia ... ), by industrial and technological policies 
(Amsden, 1991 and 1992b). Contrary to neoclassical claims, the 
role of government in the East Asian NICs has not been 
detrimental to growth. Rather it has clearly facilitated it. 
Several studies have· convincingly stressed the importance o: 
government intervention, although two versions of this approach 
may be distinguished: for sorne analysts, the role of the state 
has been market-sustaining, as it has "governed the market" 
(Wade, 1990); others argue instead that public intervention has 
been directed to deliberately distort relative prices in a 
determined way and that this kind of distorsion has bt-<;ln 
cor,¡ducive to high growth (Amsden, 1989). Although more discuss::''On 
ov~'r these contrasting views is surely needed, the existence of 
distorted prices of both factors and goods tends, in my view, to 
confirm Amsden' s approach: explaining growth by low wages through 
repressive labor market policies, low interest rates due to 
preferential access to credit, high prices in the domestic market 
as a result of protection and low export prices because of the 
previously noted price discrimination and of massive export 
incentives. 
In both South Korea and Taiwan, the government was able to 
influence both directly or indirectly the pattern of growth among 
industries and the investment decisions of the private sector and 
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even to create new actors (for example, the chaebol in Rorea) to 
undertake targeted iniciatives (Lee and Lee, 1992: 120). 
Several aspects of state intervention should be kept in 
mind. F irstly, the state-owned or state-controlled banking sector 
allowed the governrnent to subsidize targeted industrial 
activities. Preferential loans stimulated high levels of 
investment, which were considered necessary to import capital 
goods and to enhance efficiency. This financial control, through 
directed credit allocation, enabled the state to influence the 
financial ability of firms and to require their compliance in 
other matters, because of their high debt-equity ratios (Lee and 
Lee, 1992: 118). As Amsden has pointed out, "[ in South Rorea) the 
state used its powers to ~cipline not just workers but the 
owners and managers of capital as well" (Amsden, 1989: 64). 
Secondly, a system of massive export incentives managed to 
avoid the anti-export bias that was a feature of most Latin 
American countries in the 1960s and 1970s, while they were 
deepening their import-substitution policies. But it also even 
more than offset the negative impact of protection on outward-
oriented production, creating a new bias as the effective 
exchange rate for exports was driven up to surpass the rate for 
imports. According to several specialists, South Rorea and Taiwan 
were • trade-biased economies" (Fransman, 1984) wi th • export-push 
regimes" (Bradford, 1990). The export incentives are well known 
(Rhee, 1985): favourable import conditions (export firms had 
privileged access to import licenses and intermediate inputs and 
capital goods used in export production could be imported without 
tariffs)¡ fiscal advantages (exemptions from indirect taxes and 
direct taxes reductions)¡ preferential exchange rates and access 
to working capital borrowing for exporters, etc •• 
10 
Thirdly, unlike 
successful as it 
technology transfer 
Latin America, FOl monitoring was extremely 
avoided denationalization and enhanced 
from foreign firms. As Mardon (1990) has 
clearly stated, South Korea has tended to view foreign loans as 
a more desirable form of foreign capital penetration than FOl and 
has prefered joint-ventures to wholly-owned subsidiaries. The 
government approved foreign ownership levels exceeding 50 percent 
only if the subsidiary produced exclusively for the export market 
or the parent company agreed to transfer advanced technology. As 
a result, FOl's share of gross domestic capital formation was in 
1990 substantially lower in South Korea (0.8 per cent) than in 
Brazil (1.3 percent) or Mexico (5.6 per cent) (World Bank, 1992: 
Table E.3). 
Fourthly, technology policies were conducive to substantial 
improvements in the economy. The development strategy relied 
heavily on borrowing advanced technologies to enhance 
competitiveness and growth. This policy was also pursued in 
several other developing countries. What seems to be unique to 
the Asian NlCs is that they relied less than other economies on 
formal mechanisms of technology transfer (FOl and licenses) and 
more on informal mechanisms (such as the 
embodying new technologies, turnkey 
engineering). Another difference is 
import of capital goods 
plants, and reverse 
that the import of 
disembodied technologies was centralized in the hands of the 
state, thus allowing the bureaucracy to find the most suitable 
and cheapest technology and to foster the bargaining position of 
the recipient, for instance trading market access for favourable 
terms in the transfer (Kim and Oahlman, 1992 and Enos and Park, 
1988). 
Finally, in the case of Taiwan the government was able to 
influence the small and medium private firms' decisions through 
their linkages with the large-scale enterprises, which have been 
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until very recently state-owned. Taiwan presented in the 1950s 
and the 1960s the biggest public sector in the world outside the 
centrally planned economies and Sub-Saharan Africa: the public 
enterprise share of manufacturing production was 56 per cent in 
1952 and 44 per cent in 1960 (Wade, 1990: 88). Thus, in Taiwan, 
although direct intervention through credit control was somewhat 
less important than in South Rorea, the state-owned enterprises 
allowed the government to influence microeconomic decisions in 
the private sector. 
(b) Gradual liberalization in the 1980s 
McRinnon (1991a) has persuasively argued, on theoretical and 
empirical grounds, for an adecuat~. sequencing of reforms: 
macroeconomic stabilization should be attained before 
implementing trade liberalization and financial liberalization 
should proceed afterwards (see al so Wade, 1990: 368). Moreover, 
McRinnon a1so suggests that instant or big bang reforms (rapid 
stabilization, 1iberalization and ownership changes) cou1d easi1y 
misfire. 
The 1ibera1ization experiences of the Asian NICs in the 
1980s tend to support McRinnon's posture. In South Rorea, 
"imports were 1ibera1ized in a se1ective way and regu1ations over 
the financia1 system ( .•• ) lifted gradually" (Solimano, 1992: 
33) • 
Concerning trade 1iberalization, South Rorea and Taiwan did 
not extensively liberalized their imports in the 1980s. A1though 
pressure from the United States, whose bilateral trade deficits 
with the four Asian NICs (South Rorea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) reached a quarter of its global deficit in 1987, 
imposed, a10ng with currency appreciation, some kind of trade 
1ibera1ization, this was not accomp1ished in an indiscriminate 
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fashion and was only carried out after attaining macroeconomic 
stability, contrary to the experience of most Latin American 
countries during the decade. 
In Korea, the liberalization of imports involved mainly the 
easing of the discretionary import licensing scheme (Kim, 1990). 
Relatively high tariffs and other safeguards were maintained. 
Furthermore, the process allowed for the postponement of real 
import liberalization where firms found themselves in trouble in 
adjusting to the new conditions. A recent study has concluded 
that it was a "gradual liberalization over a number of years 
according to a preannounced, phased timetable" (Young, 1992: 
200). 
Turning now to financial liberalization, it should be kept 
in mind that the South Rorean government, although it privatised 
most banks in the early 1980s, remained often the biggest 
shareholder and maintained effective control over the banking 
institutions through its personnel policies (Lee and Lee, 1992: 
117). Moreover, Amsden and Euh ( 1993) have argued that the 
freeing of interest rates was not general. Preferential access 
to credit for specific groups of borrowers has continued: all 
financial institutions, including foreign banks, were required 
to keep a certain portion of their loans for small- and medium-
size enterprises; export financing continued to be regulated by 
the central bank, under government direction (Westphal, 1990: 44-
5). In the 1980s, the government provided attractive 
opportunities to savers not so much by freeing interest rates and 
rather by an alternative route - the stock market. It continued 
to lower the cost of capital to investors by developing plant 
si tes, providing tax breaks for R & D and financing joint 
ventures in R & O between government and business. It developed 
highly regulated nonbank financial institutions, imposed tight 
controls on capital exports (since the current account balance 
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returned to deficit in 1989) and subjected the amount of foreign 
capital invested in the stock market to a ceiling (Amsden and 
Euh, 1993). 
3. POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE: 
SOME CAUTIONARY NOTES 
Post-socialist transitions in Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s and early 1990s have be en probably the most ambitious 
attempts of economic reform in modern times. Since from the oulSet 
they have been suffering from enormous macroeconomic irnbalances 
(high inflation rates and large public and current account 
deficits), at odds with the situation in, for example, pre-1979 
China, the reform process should necessarily ,i"wol ve sorne. kind 
of stabilization. Furthermore, structural reforms (economic 
liberalization and ownership changes) should also form necessary 
elements of the reform package. 
It should be remembered, however, that the extent of 
stabilization and structural reform is a highly controversial 
matter. There is certainly scope for extensive argument about the 
adecuate degree and proper sequencing of those mea sures (Hughes 
and Hare, 1992: 83). 
(a) Stabilization 
The shock therapy-type stabilization in Eastern Europe has 
been proposed, and even extensively applied, as the only mean of 
confronting the enormous macroeconomic irnbalances. Price reform, 
demand contraction and currency devaluation are the main 
ingredients of the stabilization packages started in Poland, 
Romania, and former Yugoslavia in 1990 and in Bulgaria and the 
former CSFR in 1991 (Fry and Nuti, 1992: 30). 
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Price liberalization has often led to an initial 
inflationary outburst, to large cuts in real wages and, 
consequently, to a depressed demand of consumer goods. Together 
with the effective demand contraction (tight monetary and fiscal 
policies), which has resulted in a fall in capital formation, 
this has be en conducive to a protracted slump in economic 
activity and growth. The cumulative percentage !all in industrial 
production in 1990-92 has been 54 per cent in Bulgaria and 
Romania, 40 percent in Czechoslovaquia and 32 per cent in Hungary 
and Poland (The Economist, 1993: 9). 
Moreover, the initial currency devaluation has exacerbated 
inflation, as it increased import prices of machinery and 
technology, and has obliged the use of a fixed exchange rate as 
an antiinflationary device. 
The result of this big bang-type stabilization has not only 
be en a sharp recession, but also the threat that the squeeze in 
living standard s may lead to an eros ion of the socio-political 
support to reforms and even to sorne kind of drematic policy 
reversal. 
In view of these developments, a more gradualist approach 
to stabilization would appear to be urgently needed (Solimano, 
1992) . 
(b) Structural reforms 
It shou1d be noted that a trade liberalization undertaken 
too rapidly may involve several negative side effects (Solimano, 
1992: 6 and 29; Taylor, 1992: 15): 
- a reduction in fiscal revenues in a context of high public 
deficits. The fall in government revenue, caused by privatization 
in agriculture and a decline in profitability of state-owned 
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enterprises, ie accompanied by a rise in government epending, in 
spite of tight fiscal policies and the reduction in product 
subsidies following price liberalization, because of increasing 
financial incentives to private manufacturing and the creation 
of a safety net for the newly unemployed. '1'0 control public 
deficite, the building of institutional etructures to collect 
taxes, along lines suggested by McKinnon (1991b), should have 
be en made before trade liberalization; 
- a shift in domestic demand towards imports, exacerbated 
by the fall in domestic output. '1'ogether with the reduction in 
local spending power that follows a devaluation in presence of 
trade deficits (in the sense that devaluation raises exporters 
gains less than importers costs) ('1'aylor, 1993: 581), tbis has 
created recessionary results. All this has transpirea in the 
context of an important external trade shock (the termination of 
Comecon, the forrner Eastern bloc trade organisation, which in 
1989 took 70-80 percent of many countries' exports). At the same 
time, a growth of exports to western markets is unlikely, because 
of qua lit y problems and/or increased protectionism in EC markets. 
'1'he flood of new goods into domestic markets may al so reduce 
national savings rates and thus limit the possibility of 
financing public deficits in a non-inflationary manner; 
- a squeeze in foreign exchange, which reduces the import 
capacity and thus the possibility of buying foreign capital 
goods. Furtherrnore, the use of a fixed exchange rate as an 
antiinflationary device tends to price exporters out of world 
markets. '1'he import capacity is then unable to rise. What is 
more, the Argentinian and Chilean experiences of freezing the 
exchange rate in the late 1970s furtherrnore suggests that this 
policy may ultimately lead to unsustainable trade deficits and 
to massive capital flight, in anticipation of a maxi-devaluation 
that will surely follow ('1'aylor, 1993: 581). Savers will move 
their savings abroad, even if capital flight is nominally 
prohibi ted, through overinvoicing imports and underinvoicing 
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exports, that is, transfer pricing. So a managed crawling peg, 
with the domestic currency linked to some foreign currencies 
basket, may be a more appropriate policy (Fry and Nuti, 1992: 
26) • 
Turning now to privatizations, the radical approach 
emphasizes the need for the state to quickly sell loss-making big 
enterprises. This measure may, when foreign or local buyers are 
found, reduce the burden on public finance. According to this 
approach, shares in state-owned enterprises had been distributed 
widely to all citizens in several Eastern European countries, as 
in former Czechoslovaquia and Russia in 1992. This instantaneous 
people I s capi talism could perfectly misfire, as it doesn I t 
resolve the probem of management. What is more, if shares are too 
widely-dispersed the decision-making process may even become an 
important problem. privatization also eliminates potential 
sources of government revenue. A more gradualist approach, along 
the lines suggested by Kornai (1990) and McKinnon (1992) may be 
more appropriate. The creation of small-scale capitalism should 
be encouraged before large-scale privatizations, while the latter 
process should be gradual, recognizing the implicit ownership 
rights of employees, pension funds and banks holding debts and 
maintaining the government as the dominant shareholder (McKinnon, 
1992: 35). 
On the other hand, the support of loss-making public 
enterprises has been conducive to low interest rates, which have 
accelerated inflation. Raising the attractiveness of deposit 
money, in order to curb inflation, avoid capital flight and 
facilitate a non-inflationary deficit financing, may be 
necessary. The impact of this measure on private enterprises 
could be compensated by e1iminating temporarily the taxation on 
profits generated within domestically-owned enterprises in the 
liberalized sector (McKinnon, 1991b: 114). Furthermore, 
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unregulated and premature financial liberalization, in the 
absence of a competitive banking system and prudential regulation 
and supervision and without a prior macroeconomic stability, may 
lead to acute financial crises, as was the 
American countries (McKinnon, 1989). 
experiments have demonstrated that these 
case in several Latin 
'l'he Southern Cone 
crises may result in 
major regressive redistributions of income and wealth, as can be 
seen in the Chilean case after 1982: massive subsidies to 
bankrupt banks and debtors imposed a sharp cut in social and 
infrastructure spending (Solimano, 1992: 9). 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Free trade is not always conducive to high growth. 'l'he 
experience of the Asian NICs has shown that protection may be 
justified, but only if import barriers are erected to fulfil 
several objectives in a developmental strategy. South Korea and 
Taiwan used protection as an "incubator" of export sectors, as 
a mechanism to enhance external competitiveness and as a lever 
to diversify the industrial structure. This protectionist path 
has proved to be very successful. On the other hand, the use of 
protection in order to simply insulate domestic industry from the 
world economy, as in Latin America between 1950-80, has proved 
to be inadecuate. And, of course, the indiscriminate import 
liberalization applied in most Latin American countries in the 
1980s was conducive to a "lost decade", in which per capita 
in come declined. 
Moreover, it is certain that the collapse of the centrally 
planned economies of Eastern Europe has shown that markets are 
necessary for sustained economic growth and development. 
Nevertheless, the experiences of the Asian NICs, together with 
those of sorne developed countries, such as Japan or Germany, 
suggest that markets are not a sufficient condition for achieving 
18 
these goals: state intervention is al so needed. This conclusion 
also arises from the failures of neo liberal experiments in the 
Southern Con e of Latin America in the late 1970s and even from 
their equivalents in sorne developed countries, such as the United 
Kingdom under Thatcher. Moreover, in the depth of a recession 
like the present one, we should not be too confident on the 
superiority of the market mechanism. 
Furthermore, the sequencing and degree of economic 
liberalization have proved to be extremely important. The East 
Asian NICs followed a predetermined path of liberalizations. They 
did not initiate them until they had managed to attain 
macroeconomic stability, and liberalization of the trade regime 
preceded the deregulation of the financial system. Furthermore, 
as has be en suggested, the trade and financial liberalizations 
that South Korea and Taiwan undertook in the 1980s were cautious: 
import restrictions (specially for high-technology imports) were 
maintained and the financial system remained fundamentally 
repressed, although less than in the previous periodo 
Thus, "East Asia' s stellar growth performance, in 
conjunction with their ambiguous liberalization record and 
extensive use of industrial policy, concretely challenge free 
market reform as a structural development strategy" (Amsden, 
1992a: 2) 
Thus the post-socialist governments in Eastern Europe since 
1990 may prove then to have chosen a wrong path. The negative 
impact of shock therapy-type stabilizations has been discussed 
above. Moreover, the premature trade and financial 
liberalizations, undertaken before attaining macroeconomic 
stability and building an efficient tax system, may have the same 
inconveniences that they featured in the Southern Con e of Latin 
America in the 1970s: rising budget deficits (Hungary's was 7 per 
19 
cent and Poland's 5 per cent of gros s domestic product in 1992 
and are likely to rise to 11 and 10 per cent, respectively, in 
1993) (The Economist, 1993: 15); a shift in domestic demand 
towards imports; a squeeze in foreign exchange; capital flight¡ 
financial crises; regressive redistributions of wealth and so on. 
It should also be noted that the current liberal reforms may 
be conducive to political radicalismo Sorne warnings may be 
necessary as the "adoption of an unmodified market economy as the 
goal, and its achievement by shock methods, will require 
authoritarian methods, not just in the short run° (Mclntyre, 
1993) • 
It has been suggested that "Eastern Europe's current free 
market policies ( •.. ) are generally inadequate to render 
potentially promising manufacturing enterprises competitive in 
world markets" (AmSden, 1992a: 1). It is likely that the liberal 
• path may even prove to be inadequate to deal with the wdder 
economic issues as well. 
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